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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the haunting claims of each poor, unmarried mother in Edin
and Kefalas' Promises I Can Keep' is that at least she can guarantee she
will love her child, even though she cannot promise to make a lifelong
commitment to a mate.2 The authors write:
While the poor women we interviewed saw marriage as a luxury,
something they aspired to but feared they might never achieve,
they judged children to be a necessity, an absolutely essential part
* Margaret F. Brinig is the Fritz Duda Family Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Faculty Research, University of Notre Dame. Steven L. Nock died in January of 2008. He was
Commonwealth Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Virginia. This article is part of
a larger project on "Multi-Tiered Marriage," which draws upon ideas from Joel A. Nichols, Multi-
Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisiana to the International Com-
munity, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (Jan. 2007). The project on Multi-Tiered Marriage has
received generous funding from Emory University's Center for the Study of Law and Religion,
Pepperdine University and Pepperdine University School of Law, and the University of St.
Thomas School of Law. See Joel A. Nichols, Foreword: Marriage, Religion, and the Role of the
Civil State, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 544 (2008).
1. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT-
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 6 (2005).
2. Id. at 31.
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of a young woman's life, the chief source of identity and
meaning.3
That love, each young mother says, will be a sustaining gift benefiting both
her and the child. "Poor women realize that marriage is fragile, and so they
make their primary emotional investments in their relationships with their
children, which are not subject to the threats that so often destroy relation-
ships between men and women." 4 Similarly, in work done to counteract the
claim that it was not single parenting that made children's prospects dim,
but poverty, sociologists McLanahan and Sandefur have found that many of
the bad effects of single parenting "go away" when income is taken into
account.'
So, is love the answer here, is it income or is it something else? Does a
legal marriage-let alone a two-tiered marriage6-even matter, at least in-
sofar as children's welfare is concerned? Does it matter for all groups
equally, and if some do equally well, or poorly, with or without marriage,
should we still support marriage?
This paper will show empirically that, unsurprisingly, love, measured
in terms of parental warmth, is critically important to children's psychologi-
cal well-being. The data comes from the Child Development Supplement to
the University of Michigan's Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.7 This
sample contains nearly 2,700 children in a nationally representative sam-
ple.8 Love continues to remain important both in terms of impact and statis-
tical significance though other variables are added. Income, measured in
terms of total family income divided by the Census needs standard for a
family of that size, initially seems important to child well-being (on mea-
sures of depression, acting out, self-esteem and self-efficacy). However, for
problem behaviors, income's significance, unlike the significance of love,
typically entirely disappears once family structure and particularly legal sta-
tus like marriage and adoption comes into play. 9
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 211.
5. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS? 111 (1994)
We saw that income accounted for about half of the difference in high school dropout
rates, teen birth rates, and idleness rates between children in single-parent families as
compared with children in two-parent families. We now find that parental aspirations as
well as parental involvement and supervision play a large role in explaining the remain-
ing differences in child well-being.
6. Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisi-
ana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (2007).
7. Univ. of Mich., Panel Study of Income Dynamics, CDS & TA Guide, FAQ http://psid
online.isr.umich.edu/CDS/faq.aspx (last visited June 26, 2008). [hereinafter PSID].
8. Id.
9. This is not true for all subgroups in the sample. For African-American children, who
make up 14.6 percent of the children in the sample, income retains its importance and legal status
makes little difference. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, The One-Size Fits All Family (Notre
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"'Tis better to have loved and lost/ Than never to have loved at all,"
wrote Tennyson,"° and, from the children's perspective, we find that it is
better for parents to have married even if the marriage does not work out.
Children do better if they are in two-parent, married homes, but are worse
off in homes where their mothers never married, even than in cases where
the mother married, divorced, remarried and was widowed. Similarly, chil-
dren do better where their fathers are living in the home, but less well with
stepparents unless the stepparents adopt them. Children who live with rela-
tives-let alone foster parents-do less well than those who are adopted by
third parties.
These rather dramatic findings suggest that law and public policy, as
an instrument of law, should encourage and support marriage, particularly
marriages that last. They also suggest supporting adoption in preference to
foster care, though that is not the subject of the two-tiered marriage project.
Law can encourage official family relationships in part merely by leaving
well enough alone-by not adopting domestic partnership laws that equate
unmarried, cohabiting couples with those that are married, and by not get-
ting rid of special "privileges" enjoyed by the married when academics
clamor that such benefits are not fair. Law ought also to make pre-marriage
counseling and skills building more attractive and affordable, as some states
have done through lower license costs, and make some sort of real counsel-
ing effort requisite to divorces on non-fault grounds, as the covenant mar-
riage movement suggests." Laws can be written to require mutual consent
for divorce, or to become two-tier on the birth of children, so that the wait-
ing period for no-fault separation divorce lengthens. If pressed, we claim
that marriage by itself is typically not worthy of two tiers, but marriage with
children is "real marriage," as C.S. Lewis reportedly put it in the movie
"Shadowlands."' 2 The movie portrayed his life and his two marriages to his
wife Joy, one technical and one "in the sight of God and everybody."' 3
II. THE INCOME IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN STATUS IDEA:
THE PUSH TO DELEGALIZE MARRIAGE
The academic argument for eliminating marriage as a status begins
with the observation that family forms have changed,' 4 or that the married
household no longer comprises even half of American households (Table
1). The majority of Americans no longer live as married couples, however,
Dame Legal Studies, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-40, 2007), available at http:I/papers.
ssrn.come/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=997903.
10. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, In Memoriam, line 27, stanza 4 (1850).
11. Katherine Shaw Spaght, Covenant Marriage: An Achievable Legal Response to the In-
herent Nature of Marriage and Its Various Goods, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 467 (2006).
12. SHADOWLANDS (Price Entm't 2004).
13. Id.
14. Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81
VA. L. REV. 2181, 2188 (1995).
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so it is unfair and punitive' 5 to privilege marriage. This is particularly true
for black families, who are unfairly singled out and penalized for neglect
and abuse, when the real problem is poverty.' 6
Martha Fineman reasons that the basic unit of society revolves around
dependent people and the derivative dependence of those who care for
them. According to her, a couple's perhaps fleeting or violence-plagued ro-
mantic attachment should not be the basis for assigning lifetime support to a
biological parent of the resulting child (or, indirectly, the romantic part-
ner).17 This obligation should be met by the wider community. 8
Furthermore, marriage itself is open to challenge as a patriarchal and
hierarchical institution."' Nancy Polikoff, in her gentler version of the argu-
ment, notes that the institution of marriage has not only ancient, but also
religious roots that should be respected-as a separate tradition without
state involvement.2° On the other hand, cohabiting couples are much more
egalitarian and more reflect not only the basic equality of men and women,
but also the significant number of couples that earn similar amounts in the
labor force (or in which women earn more than their mates).2 '
The real problems for families that become entwined with the public
welfare system are poverty and racism, not marriage.22 Social policy critic
Dorothy Roberts notes that while the black family is critically important, it
is not typically a marital family.23 Likewise, she writes that adoption should
not be promoted at the expenses of protecting the biological family, includ-
ing the extended family.24
More and more academics suggest that differentiated marriage should
be confined to religious institutions, that marriage should no longer be a
15. Or "mean-spirited," according to Fineman. Id. at 2194.
16. Dorothy Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171-82. "Poverty
is key to explaining why almost any child gets in the system. It is the dominant explanation of
researchers in the field for the inequitable representation of black children. The high level of black
involvement in child protective services parallels the high level of poverty among black families."
Id. at 174-75.
17. See Fineman, supra note 14, and the more extended argument in MARTHA FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
18. Dorothy Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
555, 558 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 14, at 2183; Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask
For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
20. See Polikoff, supra note 19.
21. Martha Ertman, The Business of Intimacy: Bridging the Private-Private Distinction, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW AND SOCIETY 467 (Martha Fineman &
Terrance Dougherty eds., 2005).
22. Roberts, supra note 18, at 567-68, 576.
23. Id. at 571.
24. Id. at 579.
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status but that private relationships should be treated alike by the state.25
The Law Commission of Canada26 suggested that Canadian
[g]overnments have taken important steps forward in recent years
by extending rights and obligations to persons who are living in
non-marital relationships, whether same-sex or opposite sex. But
this extension of rights and obligations has maintained the legal
focus on conjugal relationships. A more principled and compre-
hensive approach is needed to encompass the full range of
Canadians' close personal adult relationships.
27
This report culminated in the extension of full benefits to cohabiting
couples-of whatever gender composition-in C-23 and the redefinition of
marriage in C-38 (which received royal assent on July 20, 2005).28
Courts and legislatures in some jurisdictions have taken more affirma-
tive actions to institutionalize and support cohabitation, including establish-
ing legal principles of "non-discrimination" between married and
cohabiting couples and equalizing government benefits for formal and in-
formal unions.29 Government could remove barriers to cohabitation for sin-
gle mothers such as "man-in-the-house" welfare rules.3 °
25. See Michael Broyde, Some Thoughts on New York State Regulation of Jewish Marriage:
Covenant, Contract or Statute?, (Project on Multi-Tiered Marriage, St. Thomas School of Law,
forthcoming); Ann Laquer Estin, Toward a Multicultural Family Law, 38 FAM. L.Q. 501 (2004).
26. LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE ADULT RELATIONSHIPS, xi (2001).
27. Id.
28. The history of the change in the Canadian understanding of marriage as well as the
conclusion that "Marriage will remain a fundamental social institution in Canada" can be found in
Nicholas Bala, The History and Future of the 'Legal Family' in Canada 26 (Queen's University
Legal Studies, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-16, 2007), available at http://papers.
ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1030534.
29. Some domestic partner legislation, and C-23 in Canada, does this. Winifred Holland,
Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?,
17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114 (2000). It is rarer for the duty of support during the relationship to be the
same as in marriage, but the civil union legislation in Vermont is an example. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
91, §§ 1202 et seq. (2000). Even in Norway, where about twenty-five percent of couples are
unmarried, "[u]nlike married couples, cohabiting couples have no legal responsibility to provide
for each other." Turid Noak, Cohabitation in Norway: An Accepted and Gradually More Regu-
lated Way of Living, INT'L J. L. POL. & FAM. 102, 110 (2001). Compare the domestic partnership
rules for medical insurance at Iowa (available only to same-sex couples), which require mutual
support. See http://www.uiowa.edu/hr/benefits/forms/ (scroll down the "Human Resources - Uni-
versity Benefits" page; then select the "Faculty, P&S, and MSE" pdf under the "Domestic Partner
Affidavits" heading).
30. AFDC historically worked to deny benefits to cohabiting indigent adults. See Smith v.
King, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (cohabitant could support the indigent mother and children, so the
government did not need to). More recently, TANF payments have been structured to encourage
marriage. Though married couples may receive temporary assistance, the second wage earner
must be unemployed or disabled if the couple cohabits. Many states now terminate spousal sup-
port if the former wife cohabits with another-it would cease anyway if she remarried since the
second spouse would assume the responsibility of supporting a needy wife. Wendell E. Primus &
Jennifer Beeson, Safety Net Programs, Marriage, and Cohabitation, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER:
IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND SOCIAL POLICY 191, 197, 205 (Alan
Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002).
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The most radical view, espoused by some academics, 3 would abolish
marriage as a legal institution-although it could of course remain a relig-
ious practice. In this view, the law should treat all family forms the same.
The move towards recognizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts has
created surprising support for this view from some advocates of the tradi-
tional legal definition of marriage. Douglas Kmiec and Mark Scarberry of
Pepperdine University recently urged that Massachusetts "temporarily get
out of the new marriage business entirely," rather than offer same-sex
couples marriage licenses.32
It is important to note that in our argument we are not talking primarily
about "boundary conditions" as in the work of Robin Wilson33 or Dorothy
Roberts:34 families where the public welfare system may intervene because
of abuse and neglect. We cannot say much about these children here be-
cause they are not in the dataset we analyzed. We have constrained our
sample to the ninety-five percent of children who are living with their
mothers, except in the case of two parent adoption, and nothing in the data
speaks to extensive interaction with social services.35
III. COMPETING IDEA: THE FORMAL FAMILY MAKES A DIFFERENCE
In contrast to suggestions for the decoupling of marriage and its legal
effects, we argue that marriage and legal parenting matter, not only for the
adults involved, but for their children. While we would certainly be pleased
if childhood poverty could be greatly reduced and if basic living conditions
for Americans could be improved, we argue that it is more important to
legally protect and strengthen marriage and the rights and obligations that
come with legal parenting. Although research shows that the effects for the
majority of children do not hold true equally for girls and boys, nor for
some racial subgroups, we do not believe that these differences (since they
do not run counter to what we find for most children) suggests abolition of
the status effects for all.
We believe that the children ought to do better when parents have legal
responsibility for each other and all the other benefits and obligations of
31. Martha Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1215 (1998); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
32. Quoted in Adam Liptak, A Troubled 'Marriage': Core of Massachusetts Dispute is Tied
to Traditional Exclusivity of the Word, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A26.
33. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1363 (2007).
34. See Roberts, supra note 16; Roberts, supra note 18. Roberts is primarily concerned about
families at risk for involvement in the child welfare system.
35. We can also say nothing directly about the effects of same-sex parenting, since no
couples of that type self-identified in the dataset. Even if they were represented at what is assumed
to be the normal rate, according to Table I, this would only be 0.7 percent of unmarried house-
holds (which themselves comprise twenty-seven percent of the total), or around 0.2 percent of the
whole. In our sample of 3,000 children, that would be six children. See PSID, supra note 7.
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marriage, and when they are also legal parents of the children. Both of us
have written before, and at length, about the theoretical reasons for this
belief. In one sense, this is an extension of a simple economic argument
dealing with the permanence of the relationship. People are more apt to
behave strategically, that is, look out for their own short-term interests,
when they know the relationship is about to end. In game theory36 terms,
this is referred to as the "last period problem." When they know they are in
a long-term relationship-"until death do us part" or at least until the age of
emancipation-they have incentives to "specifically invest" in the relation-
ship and in the other party to it. Additionally, though we understand this
reasoning is somewhat circular, legal recognition provides a signal for the
provision of all kinds of outside support for the family, whether by govern-
ment, by extended family or by other affinity groups. With the lack of self-
seeking behavior, the great investments and the outside support, families
ought to thrive, and these benefits should accrue to children as well as
adults.
IV. LOVE CONQUERS ALL
It is also possible that neither money nor legal status critically affects
child outcome: what is most important is whether parents love their children
and communicate this love to them. This outcome would be expected by
mental health professionals who have long stressed the importance of at-
tachment37 and psychological parenthood.38 In a way, this would be an opti-
mistic result, offering hope for children in even the worst circumstances and
the least stable family situations. If it turned out that only love matters,
there wouldn't be much law could-or should-do to mold families except
to let them alone.
V. How COULD WE TEST THE COMPETING THEORIES?
We will present a test for these various ways of looking at families.
Again, a test of the first-for decreasing legal recognition of marriage and
parenthood, or making it solely a private contractual matter-should show
that different child outcomes are necessarily related to income. In other
words, children who live in higher income families should do better than
those who are poor. To the extent that legal status makes a difference con-
36. For an accessible text on game theory, see ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (Blackwell Publishers 2001) (1989).
37. See, e.g., JOHN BOWLBY, ArACHMENT (1982); William L. Cook, Understanding Attach-
ment Security in Family Context, 78 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 285 (2000); Charles Zenah
et al., Representations of Attachment in Mothers and Their One Year Old Infants, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 278 (1993).
38. The most famous source for this concept is GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT's, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973). A landmark case that may have been decided using this
standard is Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
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sidered alone, it should vanish when family income is also included in the
analysis.
If we are correct in suggesting that legal marriage and parenthood mat-
ter-and that legal relationship status should be preserved if not strength-
ened-then, children should fare best in two-parent, married households or
when legally adopted, compared to all other living arrangements and even
when controlling for income.
If the most important characteristic is love, it should remain significant
regardless of what other variables are added. In addition, the difference that
love makes to child outcomes should be a large one. Legal rules should then
promote family autonomy, except in cases of abuse and neglect. Perhaps
parenting classes could be encouraged in cases where the parents no longer
live together and the legal system is involved anyway.39
Of course, combinations of these hypotheses might be working as
well. In this case all the variables of interest should remain significant and
the coefficients should be relatively large. The legal solution would try to
reduce poverty, promote marriage and adoption and secure family
autonomy.
A. The Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a nationally represen-
tative longitudinal study headquartered in the Institute for Social Research
at the University of Michigan.4" The PSID is based on a representative sam-
ple of American individuals (men, women and children) and their families.
It emphasizes the dynamic aspects of economic and demographic behavior,
but its content is broad, including sociological and psychological measures.
As a consequence of low attrition rates, the success in following young
adults as they form their own families and recontact efforts (for those de-
clining an interview in prior years), the sample size grew from 4,800 fami-
lies in 1968 to more than 7,000 families in 2001. The PSID has collected
information about more than 65,000 individuals spanning as much as 36
years of their lives. The PSID data from 1969-2005 are publicly available
on the project's website. Between 1968 and 1997, data on PSID individuals
39. Some states routinely require divorcing parents to attend such classes or to view movies
on children of divorce, with some reported success in reducing friction between the parents. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21G (West 2008) (requiring parent education for divorcing parent
who is a minor); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/5(i) (West 2008) (providing parent education and
other child welfare services); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/608(c) (West 2008) (allowing court to
order parental education at time of divorce).
40. The internet "home page," PSID, http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu (last visited June 26,
2008), indicates the following:
The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal study of nearly 8,000 U.S. families.
Following the same individuals since 1968, the PSID collects data on economics, health,
and social behavior. The CDS focuses on the children and caregivers within PSID fami-
lies, collecting information on education, health, cognitive and behavioral development,
and time use.
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were collected each year. Beginning in 1997, data has been collected every
other year.
The Child Development Supplement (CDS) is one research component
of the PSID. While the PSID has always collected some information about
children, in 1997 the PSID supplemented its main data collection with addi-
tional information on zero to twelve-year-old children and their parents.
The objective was to provide researchers with a comprehensive, nationally
representative and longitudinal data base of children and their families from
which to study the dynamic process of early human capital formation. The
CDS-I successfully completed interviews with 2,394 families (eighty-eight
percent), providing information on 3,563 children. In 2002-2003, the CDS
re-contacted families in CDS-I who remained active in the PSID panel as of
2001. CDS-II successfully re-interviewed 2,021 families (ninety-one per-
cent) who provided data on children and adolescents aged five to eighteen
years. These are the children whose outcomes we analyze here.
Because the CDS is a supplement to the PSID, the study takes advan-
tage of an extensive amount of family demographic and economic data
about the CDS target child's family, providing more extensive family data
than any other nationally-representative longitudinal survey of children and
youth in the United States. In addition, the PSID-CDS data are "intergener-
ational" in structure with information contained in several decades of data
about multiple family members. This rich data structure allowed us a
unique opportunity to fully link information on children, their parents, their
grandparents and other relatives to take advantage of the rich intergenera-
tional and long-panel dimensions of the data.
B. Methods and Questions
As should be evident from the preceding paragraphs, the PSID
presents a terrific, free of charge source for intergenerational study. It also
presents significant challenges to the researcher who must learn to connect
the files needed (in our case, going from child in the CDS to parent to
grandparent over multiple years, with both individual and family files in-
volved, with marriage and charitable histories in separate files). When we
had accomplished this task, we formulated questions we thought we might
be able to answer from the data.
Based upon prior work, we believe that favorable characteristics in
children are most likely to develop in a relationship that the participants (at
least the adult participants) view as permanent and stable and that in fact
turns out to be stable.4 Many studies, both in the United States and West-
41. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should
Cohabitation be the (Legal) Default Option? 64 LA. L. REV. 403 passin (2004); Margaret Brinig
& Steven L. Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 9, 25 (2000); Margaret F.
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em Europe, have shown that marriage is more stable than cohabitation.
Many studies (ours included),42 have shown that, at least in the National
Survey of Families and Households in the early 1990s, parents' or one's
own prior divorce predict instability in one's own marriage. The more per-
manent the marriage-for example, choosing covenant versus standard
marriage in Louisiana-the more the parties change during the first years of
marriage to become committed, interdependent spouses.4 3 We have also
shown previously that adolescent children do better, at least in terms of
depression, if their parents are living together and if their mother's last rela-
tionship did not end in divorce, and worse, for all groups of children, in
foster care than in marriage, adoption or kinship care. We also hypothesize,
though, that the causality runs in both directions, that community recogni-
tion, or status, should encourage essential trust to develop.' Thus interra-
cial marriages are less stable than intraracial marriages, perhaps because of
lack of support.4 5 Again, cohabitation, an informal relationship, provides
fewer benefits and is less stable than marriage.46
1. Method
We saw that more than ninety-five percent of the children in the CDS
lived mainly with their biological mothers, we excluded most other living
arrangements (other than children living with two adoptive parents) (Tables
2 & 3).47 First, the sample size in these groups was simply too small to
draw valid conclusions. The largest excluded sample is for children living
with biological fathers, and it is only 83 children. Second, these families
were likely to differ on a large number of other dimensions that we could
not account for but which involved separation from biological mothers.
Children are highly likely to live with their mothers, and if they do not, it is
typically because of her death or because of her abuse, neglect or abandon-
Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter? Adoptions by Kin Caregivers, 36
FAM. L.Q. 449 passim (2002).
42. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, "I Only Want Trust": Norms, Trust, and Auton-
omy, 32 J. Soclo-EcoNoMics 471-87 (2003), reprinted in FAMILY LIFE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115
(Peter Lodrup & Eva Modvar eds., 2004). For a survey, see NICHOLAS H. WOLFINGER, UNDER-
STANDING THE DIVORCE CYCLE: THE CHILDREN OF DIVORCE IN THEIR OWN MARRIAGES (2005).
43. Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 169, 185-86 (2003).
44. Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM.
ISSUES 53-76 (1995); Brinig & Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter?, supra note 41, at
469-74; Brinig & Nock, Marry Me, Bill, supra note 41, at 427; Brinig & Nock, supra note 42, at
471-87.
45. Margaret F. Brinig, The Child's Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on Interracial
Intimacies, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2129, 2150 (2004) (book review).
46. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, supra note 44, at
53-76; Brinig & Nock, Marry Me, Bill, supra note 41, at 409, 421-26.
47. As detailed in the PSID's technical documentation, weights supplied on PSID data files
are designed to compensate for both unequal selection probabilities and differential attrition and
were used in our analysis. See PSID, supra note 7.
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ment of the child, all of which would undoubtedly have major influences on
our dependent variables of interest.
We report five sets of equations, with five models in each. The depen-
dent variables-or effects we are trying to predict-are the Behavior
Problems Scale (BPS, measured in 2002) and its separate Internal and Ex-
ternal Scales,48 the Pearlin Self-Efficacy Scale49 and the Rosenberg self-
48. The behavior problem scale (G23, G32) was developed by James Peterson and Nicholas
Zill to measure the incidence and severity of child behavior problems in a survey setting. James L.
Peterson & Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior
Problems in Children, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295, 295 (1986). Many of the items are from the
Achenbach Behavior Problems Checklist. Thomas M. Achenbach & Craig S. Edelbrock, Behav-
ioral Problems and Competencies Reported by Parents of Normal and Disturbed Children Aged
Four Through Sixteen, 46 MONOGRAPHS Soc'Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1-82 (1981). Exactly the same
set of items used in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) was used in the PSID
Child Development Supplement in order to maximize comparability between the two data sets,
though the questions PSID-CDS asked were of children three and older while the NLSY began the
questions at age four. The scale is based on responses by the primary caregiver as to whether a set
of thirty problem behaviors is often, sometimes or never true of the child. Behaviors include
having sudden changes in mood or feeling, is fearful or anxious, bullies or is cruel or mean,
demands a lot of attention. Behaviors are also divided into two subscales, a measure of externaliz-
ing or aggressive behavior and a measure of internalizing, withdrawn or sad behavior. Scores
provided are raw scores on the scales. Items G23aa, bb, cc and dd were added by NLSY staff to
provide additional measurement for the withdrawn behavior scale. Finally, items G32 a and b are
part of the Behavior Problems Scale but are only applicable to school-age children. We created
one behavior problems scale by summing the scores on the raw items with direction of scoring
reversed, using the 30 items for all children. We also created separate scores for two subscales,
internal or withdrawn and external or aggressive. The analyst can either add the two items for
school-age children to the thirty-item scale, or, as we did in Healthy Environments, Healthy Chil-
dren: Children in Families, use the two items as a separate scale of school problems. SANDRA L.
HOFFERTH, INST. Soc. RESEARCH, HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTS, HEALTHY CHILDREN: CHILDREN IN
FAMILIES 1-19 (1998). Table 6 shows how the thirty items for all children three and older map
onto the external and internal scales.
TABLE 6. BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS INDEX FACTORS AND RELIABILITIES
Question External In
a (He/She)has sudden changes in mood or feeling. X
b (He/She)feels or complains that no one loves him/her.
c (He/She)is rather high strung and nervous. X
d (He/She)cheats or tells lies. X
e (He/She)is too fearful or anxious.
f (He/She)argues too much. X
g (He/She)has difficulty concentrating, cannot pay attention for long. X
h (He/She)is easily confused, seems to be in a fog.
i (He/She)bullies or is cruel or mean to others. X
j (He/She)is disobedient. X
k (He/She)does not seem to feel sorry after (he/she)misbehaves. X
I (He/She)has trouble getting along with other children. X
m (He/She)is impulsive, or acts without thinking. X
n (He/She)feels worthless or inferior.
o (He/She)is not liked by other children.
p (He/She)has difficulty getting (his/her) mind off certain thoughts.
q (He/She)is restless or overly active, cannot sit still. X
r (He/She)is stubborn, sullen, or irritable. X
s (He/She)has a very strong temper and loses it easily. X
t (He/She)is unhappy, sad or depressed.
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esteem scale." What we have done in the case of each dependent variable
is to begin with a very simple model in which the only independent (or
predictive) variable is income, that is, total family income divided by the
census needs index for that size family. That is, we begin with the econo-
mists' assumption that income should be able to purchase the goods needed
to meet needs including emotional needs.5" This explanation also fits that of
those seeking to delegalize marriage.
The next step is to add in family structure: with whom does the child
live, and, for example, does it matter that she lives with her mother alone
versus with both biological parents? This set of variables, which obviously
interacts with income,52 has certainly been the focus of policy debates for
many years, from those of King v. Smith 53 to those surrounding single par-
ent adoption and custody disputes following divorce.
In the third model, unique to our study, we add in the legal relation-
ships between the parties, looking for whether it matters that the mother
ever married or that a stepfather adopted a child. Again, we hold income
and family structure constant to see whether it is the "de jure" or "de facto"
situation that matters most.
54
In the fourth model, we add only one, important, variable: parental
warmth. Even in the worst of circumstances from a demographic point of
view, does the child profit from the parents' demonstrated love? A positive
response to this inquiry will show that our findings do not depend upon
social class. If parental warmth matters despite a host of other variables, the
v (He/She)breaks things on purpose or deliberately destroys (his/ X X
her)own or another's things.
w (He/She)clings to adults. * * X
x (He/She)cries too much. X X
y (He/She)demands a lot of attention. X X
z (He/She)is too dependent on others. X X
aa (He/She)feels others are out to get (him/her). X X
bb (He/She)hangs around with kids who get into trouble. * * X
cc (He/She)is secretive, keeps things to (himself/herself). X X
dd (He/She)worries too much. X X
Number of items 16 13 30
Cronbach's alpha 0.86 0.81 0.90
Unweighted N 2646
49. Leonard I. Pearlin et al., The Stress Process, 22 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV., 337-56
(1981).
50. MORRIS ROSENBERG, CONCEIVING THE SELF 291-96 (1979).
51. A simple example might be that for a single parent under some stress, purchase of take
home food or other services might give more time to devote to active parenting. A child of means
with emotional problems might be able to afford counseling that a poor child could not.
52. See, e.g., McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 5, at 94.
53. 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (holding that the presence of a male cohabitant in the
household could not keep the mother from receiving public assistance).
54. An early (successful) attempt to look at families' de jure relationships is Butcher v. Supe-
rior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 68-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), which allowed an unmarried cohabi-
tant to recover from a tortfeasor in wrongful death.
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findings would also be consistent with the great happiness found in rela-
tively impoverished areas of the world.55
In the fifth model, we add the mother's race and her age, as well as the
child's age and gender. It may be that some characteristics change when
race is taken into account, particularly as "normal" family structure is asso-
ciated with race.56 Certainly children born to very young mothers tend not
to fare as well as those born to older mothers,57 in part for effects associated
with lower income, in part because of lesser marital stability and in part for
purely biological reasons.
We do not anticipate that we will predict all, or even a very large part,
of the differences in outcomes. Some of these differences are simply genetic
and are not captured by income or marital status. For example, a disabled or
autistic child can be born to any parent in any family structure. We have not
yet accounted for the presence of siblings in the household-except in the
income equation-nor whether these are older or younger. Similarly, we
have not necessarily accounted for domestic violence or substance abuse as
long as these have not affected income or family structure or maternal
warmth. We have not counted the critically important influence of fathers,
except as these are captured in living structure.
2. Findings
Our results are reported in Tables 5-10. They tend to substantiate our
theory and contradict the hypothesis that all that matters for child outcomes
is income, not family structure and especially not legal families and not
warmth. One important trend can be seen in Tables 5-7, which deals with
the determinants of behavioral problems in the children in our sample. In
the first model of each table, income (household income divided by the
Census needs standard for a family of that size) is significantly related to
the outcome variable of interest. More income means less problem behav-
ior. However, by the time the family structure and legal relationships are
factored in, income is statistically insignificant, while these structural vari-
ables remain robust. Income does promote self-esteem and self-efficacy in a
significant way, and it remains significant for some subsets of our data,
notably African-Americans.
55. As colleagues have pointed out, warmth could be confounding-parents could be less
loving towards their children precisely because they were getting divorced. They could also be
less warm to the child because the child presented behavioral problems.
56. Our earlier work, Brinig & Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter?, supra note 41,
at 452, 461, suggests that outcomes for adolescents may be quite different for cultural groups with
stronger traditions of extended families.
57. Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Effects on the Children Born to Adolescent Mothers, in
KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN PREGNANCY 145,
165-71 (Rebecca A. Maynard ed., 1997).
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The second important set of observations can be most easily seen in
Table 10, the summary of significant findings. (In this table, remember that
the reference categories are white heads of households in two-parent mar-
ried families. The outcomes should be compared to these categories.) If a
child lives with his or her mother only, every outcome variable is less good.
In fact, the increase in total behavioral problems is about half a standard
deviation. Similarly, if the child's mother never married, even holding other
things like race constant, the child does worse on everything but anxiety/
depression (the internal behavioral problems). The child of a mother who
divorced was statistically no different from a child whose married parents
stayed together, whether or not she remarried or remained single. The only
other factor that behaved consistently was parental warmth. In all cases,
parental warmth decreased problem behaviors and increased self-esteem
and self-efficacy.
Another set of observations worthy of note is the difference between
adoptive, step and other-dad figures. Adoptive two-parent families were in-
distinguishable from those with two biological parents (so they do not show
up in Table 10). If only the father is adoptive, there is a noticeable effect in
externalizing problems, but no other ill-effects. (Remember that this is
likely to occur only when the mother married and was widowed or the bio-
logical father's rights were terminated, neither of which is an auspicious
outcome for children.) However, the "other dad" figure who lives with the
mother but has made no legal efforts to regularize this status is associated
with increases of half a standard deviation in total behavioral problems and
internal behavioral problems. (There are much smaller increases in self-
efficacy and self-esteem as well.) Taking the approach to just marry the
child's mother does not solve all the problems, however. The presence of a
stepfather is associated with the largest effects of the whole study on total
behavioral problems, with significant-negative from a welfare stand-
point-effects both on the external and internal scales.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY CHANGES
Taken together, the effects of family structure and relative lack of ef-
fect of income seem to support our theory that poverty does not account for
all problems in children and that family structure-and particularly mar-
riage-does matter. Warmth matters more than either income or family
structure and is consistently statistically significant.
On these outcome measures, there are obvious racial differences. Com-
pared to whites, the reference group, children in black households had
fewer internalizing problems and higher self-esteem. Children in Hispanic-
Latina households had fewer external behavioral problems but suffered
from internalizing problems and lower self-esteem and self-efficacy. Chil-
dren in Asian or Pacific Islander households had fewer behavioral problems
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on all measures. Boys showed more total and externalizing behavioral
problems, while younger children showed fewer. This is consistent with the
recent findings that men apparently suffer from anxiety and depression as
much as do women.58
These differences in race and gender prompt us to repeat here our cau-
tions about assuming that what works well for the majority will have
equally good results for all subgroups. Nonetheless, marriage and legal
parenting will not disadvantage these children. 9 We are convinced because
of our work and the work of others, that it would do more to alleviate
poverty than simply doling out money.6" Also, we caution that these are
cross-sectional rather than longitudinal results: we cannot say for sure what
causes what as opposed to which variables are associated with what
outcome.
From a public policy perspective, we'suggest enacting laws (or keep-
ing them in force) to strengthen marriage and adoption, and to keep these
formal legal statuses privileged over less formal relationships. Again, we do
not mean to suggest that no care be taken for children born to unmarried
parents or for single parents trying to raise children. Both of us believe that
keeping children, and their caretakers, from living in poverty is and should
remain a vital concern for the community. Our findings suggest, however,
that while love is associated with child well-being regardless of income, the
best locus for it is in the formal, legally recognized family. As a first cut,
therefore, we strongly oppose attempts to equate marriage with cohabita-
tion. Couples who cohabit and never marry are less likely to be stable and
58. Julie Scelfo, Men & Depression: Facing Darkness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 2007 (Web
Exclusive), available at http://www.newsweek.comid/42930/output/print.
59. We note, too, that marriage is not something that cohabiting couples of color wish to
avoid. Kristen Harknett & Sara S. McLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage after
the Birth of a Child, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 790, 798-99 (2004) (Black attitudes about marriage
among new cohabiting parents are actually stronger than those for whites (e.g., when asked
whether they agreed strongly that "marriage is better than living together," blacks answered posi-
tively 60.4 percent of the time compared to 37.9 percent for whites). Most of the difference in
marriage rates with these couples was due to the less favorable sex ratio and poorer relationship
quality among the black couples.)
60. Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love or Money? The Impact of Family Structure on
Family Income, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 57, 67-74 (2005). Economists have shown that once
married, men's earnings and labor force attachments tend to increase predictably in what is gener-
ally called the "marriage premium." Robert A. Nakosteen & Michael A. Zimmer, Men, Money,
and Marriage: Are High Earners More Prone than Low Earners to Marry?, 78 Soc. Sci. Q. 66,
80-82 (1997). STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES 75-77 (1998); Robert F. Schoeni,
Marital Status and Earnings in Developed Countries, 8 J. POPULATION EcON. 351, 351-59
(1995); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Produc-
tive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES, 282, 291-307 (1991); Kermit Daniel, The Marriage Premium, in
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 113, 113-25 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli,
eds., 1995). On the other hand, McLanahan reported that receipt of any welfare influenced the
number of white out of wedlock births, with predictable intergenerational effects including di-
vorce in adolescence. Sara S. McLanahan, Family Structure and Dependency: Early Transitions
to Female Household Headship, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 12-16 (1988).
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less likely to love each other unconditionally. While this may be relatively
unimportant (though breaking up is hard to do) for the adults involved, we
show that the conditions of cohabitation hinder, or at least do not promote,
the well-being of their children. What is relatively unimportant for adults
thus reaches critical proportions once children are involved.
We therefore support efforts to strengthen marriage. Many of these are
already in place, as the list of benefits sought by same-sex couples seeking
the rights of married persons attests. Better marriages are the goals of state
pre-marriage education efforts as well as such non-government groups as
Marriage,61 Engaged Encounter62 and the umbrella non-profit Smart Mar-
riages.63 At the federal level, President Bush's Healthy Marriage Initiative
embraces the goal of promoting and sustaining healthy unions through mul-
tiple public and private strategies. 64 More controversial, but seemingly war-
ranted, are such legislative tools as covenant marriage (available in
Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas).65 Other two-tiered systems-simply
making divorce more difficult without requiring the pre-marriage and post-
marriage counseling regimes as in covenant marriage-are being consid-
ered by states like Virginia.66 The point is that while couples may prefer for
themselves to remain unmarried, a legal preference for marriage is war-
ranted once children enter the picture.
Similarly, we support legally recognized parent-child relationships
over less formal ones, however strong these may be. Again, we recognized
that these may not always be possible, and that single parents and other
informal caretakers may do a fine job. Clearly, almost any option where
children are loved is better than leaving children in abusive relationships.
Most mothers are legally recognized as their children's parents. Blended
families seem to be associated with behavioral problems for children. We
encourage fathers who are notthe husbands of the children's mothers or
women who are in serious relationships with custodial fathers, to adopt the
child-unless there is already a participating legal father or mother. Simply
marrying the child's custodial parent, even in places where being a steppar-
ent gives significant rights and duties, 67 is not associated with positive be-
61. Worldwide Marriage Encounter, http://www.wwme.org (last visited June 26, 2008).
62. Catholic Engaged Encounter, http://www.engagedencounter.org (last visited June 26,
2008).
63. Smart Marriages, http://www.smartmarriages.com (last visited June 26, 2008).
64. Administration for Children & Families, Healthy Marriage Initiative, http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/healthymarriage/ (last visited June 26, 2008).
65. We discuss these at length in Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, What Does Covenant
Mean for Relationships?, 18 NOTRE DAME J. L. Emics & PUB. POL'Y 137 passim (2004).
66. See statutory examples, supra note 39 and accompanying text. An organization long sup-
porting mutual consent divorce and containing sample legislation can be found at Divorce Reform
Page, http://www.divorcereform.org/nha.html (last visited June 26, 2008).
67. In some states, a stepparent owes a duty of support to the children living with him or her.
See, e.g., Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983). This duty will under most circum-
stances not continue if the parties divorce. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J.
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havioral outcomes (from a child welfare perspective). Our study is
consistent with adoption being preferred over mere stepparenting, particu-
larly when being a stepparent does not make the adult responsible for the
child at least during the marriage. Guardianship or formal kinship care
should be preferred to informal kinship care (with more financial benefits
available even without more state intervention and intrusiveness into
parenting), but in most cases (except for groups with significant care done
by extended families), adoption will be still better if it is a choice. Again,
adoption makes permanent parents, stepparenting or merely assuming care
for kin does not. Foster care, by its nature transitory and not "real," is the
least good option as a permanent solution.68 Legal changes consistent with
this emphasis are the Adoption and Safe Families Act6 9 and related legisla-
tion, which privilege the rights of children to safe environments over the
rights of biological parents to maintain relationships with them. Similarly,
funding that promotes adoption for hard to place children-whether in fos-
ter care or in kinship care situations-should be continued and increased, if
possible.7 °
Finally, we add our voices to those who have argued against any as-
sumption that single parenting is as good as having two parents. Not only
will children of single parents, largely mothers, be poorer and less success-
ful educationally than children of married couples, but our results show
association with increased behavioral problems and decreased self-efficacy
and self-esteem.
1984) (holding that in an action for divorce, a stepfather should be required to pay child support
during the divorce litigation where the natural biological mother demonstrates that she is not
receiving support for the children from the biological father and establishes by affidavit that the
stepfather's conduct actively interfered with the children's support by the father so that pendente
lite support can not be obtained from the father). In the recent case of O'Rourke v. Vuturo, 638
S.E.2d 124, 130 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), the Virginia Court of Appeals found that a husband had
standing in a divorce to seek custody "as a father" even though he was not the biological father of
the child.
68. See Brinig & Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter?, supra note 41, at 458-74.
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15) (West 2008).
70. An Iowa case that discusses the statutes but that makes the decision to confine funding to
adoptees coming from foster care is Becker v. Department of Human Services, 661 N.W.2d 125,
128-29 (Iowa 2003).
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TABLE 1. CURRENT AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS
(FROM UNITED STATES CENSUS)
Male Female
householder, householder,
Married- no wife no husband
couple present present














Under 6 years only 23.00%
Under 6 years and
6 to 17 years 19.90%














SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE
Households with
one or more people
under 18 years 34.90% 46.40%
Households with
one or more people
60 years and over 30.30% 29.30%
Householder living
alone 27.10%
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Std.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
KID LIVES WITH 2 BIO
PARENTS?
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM AND
NO BIO DAD?
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM AND
ADOPTIVE DAD?
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM AND
STEPDAD
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM AND
OTHER DAD FIGURE





HEAD IS ASIAN PI
HEAD IS OTHER RACE - AM
INDIAN, ETC
ESTIMATED ATTENDANCE OF
KID AT SERVICES DRAWN
FROM 2 VARIABLES 6-9 AND
10+ AGE
IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION TO
PRIMARY CARETAKER




MOM MARRIED ONCE, STILL
INTACT









POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SCALE 02
PARENTAL WARMTH SCALE 02
BPI - TOTAL SCORE 02
BPI - EXTERNALIZING SCORE 02
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TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP PRIMARY CARE GIVER TO CHILD 2002
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid Biological mother 2,554 95.2 95.2 95.2
Stepmother 1 0.0 0.0 95.3
Adoptive mother 22 0.8 0.8 96.1
Biological father 83 3.1 3.1 99.2
Stepfather 1 0.1 0.1 99.3
Grandmother 3 0.1 0.1 99.4
Grandfather 1 0.0 0.0 99.5
Aunt 0 0.0 0.0 99.5
Sister 14 0.5 0.5 100.0
Total 2,681 100.0 100.0
TABLE 4. DOES CHILD LIVE WITH BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
(DATA ANALYZED)?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid KID LIVES WITH BOTH 1,832 68.3 68.3 68.3
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM,
NO BIO DAD 514 19.2 19.2 87.5
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD 17 0.6 0.6 88.1
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEP DAD 203 7.6 7.6 95.7
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 92 3.4 3.4 99.1
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 23 0.9 0.9 100.0
Total 2,681 100.0 100.0
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B Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 8.864 0.186 47.617 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.074 0.029 -0.058 -2.564 0.010
2 (Constant) 8.034 0.219 36.760 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.043 0.029 -0.034 -1.475 0.140
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 2.144 0.380 0.131 5.644 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 4.060 2.217 0.041 1.831 0.067
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 2.628 0.565 0.106 4.651 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 2.091 0.870 0.055 2.404 0.016
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 9.110 9.939 0.021 0.917 0.359
3 (Constant) 7.884 0.235 33.604 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.035 0.029 -0.028 -1.213 0.225
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.499 0.655 0.092 2.288 0.022
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 3.942 2.217 0.040 1.778 0.076
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 2.389 0.644 0.097 3.709 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 1.597 1.022 0.042 1.562 0.118
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 9.185 9.952 0.021 0.923 0.356
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.777 1.266 0.034 1.403 0.161
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.339 0.523 0.017 0.649 0.517
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 1.503 0.988 0.042 1.522 0.128
MOM NEVER MARRIED 1.314 0.643 0.065 2.043 0.041
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED 0.050 0.727 0.002 0.069 0.945
(Constant) 12.705 10.905 14.037 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.029 0.029 -0.023 -1.005 0.315
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.421 0.651 0.087 2.184 0.029
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 4.222 2.200 0.043 1.918 0.055
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KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEP DAD 2.340 0.639 0.095 3.660 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 1.699 1.015 0.044 1.675 0.094
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 9.526 9.877 0.022 0.964 0.335
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.452 1.258 0.027 1.154 0.249
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.397 0.519 0.020 0.765 0.444
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 1.532 0.980 0.043 1.564 0.118
MOM NEVER MARRIED 1.263 0.638 0.062 1.978 0.048
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,









CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.015 0.030 -0.012 -0.499 0.618
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.615 0.671 0.099 2.406 0.016
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 3.402 2.198 0.035 1.548 0.122
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 2.473 0.653 0.100 3.789 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 1.810 1.020 0.047 1.775 0.076
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 8.322 9.821 0.019 0.847 0.397
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.889 1.257 0.036 1.504 0.133
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.319 0.519 0.016 0.615 0.539
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 1.349 0.979 0.038 1.378 0.168
MOM NEVER MARRIED 1.330 0.669 0.066 1.989 0.047
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.103 0.722 -0.005 -0.143 0.886
PARENTAL WARMTH SCALE
02 -1.379 0.232 -0.137 -5.941 0.000
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.746 0.292 -0.057 -2.550 0.011
CHILD AGE AT TIME OF PCG
IW - YEARS 02 -0.129 0.053 -0.061 -2.418 0.016
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE -0.030 0.024 -0.033 -1.284 0.199
HEAD IS BLACK -0.856 0.467 -0.048 -1.834 0.067
HEAD IS HISPANIC-LATINO/A 0.379 0.468 0.020 0.809 0.419
HEAD IS ASIAN PI -2.477 10.871 1 -0.064 -2.845 0.004
R2 (adjusted) = .057; CDS Behavioral Problems Index - Total (2002)
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B Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 5.610 0.118 47.507 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.045 0.018 -0.055 -2.426 0.015
2 (Constant) 5.011 0.138 36.216 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.021 0.018 -0.026 -1.128 0.260
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.640 0.239 0.158 6.851 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 3.165 1.405 0.051 2.253 0.024
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEP DAD 1.703 0.358 0.108 4.757 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 1.093 0.551 0.045 1.983 0.048
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 8.059 6.298 0.029 1.280 0.201
3 (Constant) 4.906 0.148 33.056 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.016 0.018 -0.020 -0.862 0.389
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.289 0.413 0.125 3.120 0.002
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 3.074 1.404 0.049 2.190 0.029
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 1.496 0.408 0.095 3.668 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.872 0.647 0.036 1.347 0.178
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 8.239 6.303 0.029 1.307 0.191
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.393 0.754 0.045 1.849 0.065
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.327 0.331 0.026 0.988 0.323
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.815 0.625 0.036 1.305 0.192
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.819 0.406 0.064 2.017 0.044
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.091 0.459 -0.007 -0.198 0.843
(Constant) 8.497 0.571 14.890 10.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.011 0.018 -0.014 -0.619 0.536
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 1.241 0.409 0.120 3.036 0.002
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 3.284 1.389 0.052 2.364 0.018
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 1.462 0.404 0.093 3.621 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.955 0.640 0.039 1.492 0.136
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 8.502 6.236 0.030 1.363 0.173
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.249 0.746 0.040 1.674 0.094
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.369 0.327 0.029 1.127 0.260
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.828 0.618 0.036 1.340 0.181
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.774 0.402 0.060 1.926 0.054
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,









CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.007 0.019 -0.009 -0.376 0.707
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.986 0.422 0.095 2.340 0.019
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 2.615 1.385 0.042 1.888 0.059
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEP DAD 1.379 0.411 0.087 3.353 0.001
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.735 0.642 0.030 1.145 0.252
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 7.162 6.189 0.025 1.157 0.247
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 1.586 0.745 0.051 2.128 0.033
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.315 0.327 0.025 0.964 0.335
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.881 0.616 0.039 1.429 0.153
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.901 0.420 0.070 2.148 0.032
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.024 0.454 -0.002 -0.053 0.958
PARENTAL WARMTH SCALE
02 -1.039 0.146 -0.162 -7.116 0.000
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.638 0.184 -0.077 -3.472 0.001
CHILD AGE AT TIME OF PCG
IW - YEARS 02 -0.079 0.034 -0.059 -2.349 0.019
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE -0.032 0.015 -0.056 -2.188 0.029
HEAD IS BLACK -0.136 0.293 -0.012 -0.465 0.642
HEAD IS HISPANIC-LATINO/A -0.502 0.294 -0.041 -1.708 0.088
HEAD IS ASIAN PI -1.411 10.549 -0.057
R2 (adjusted) = .074; CDS Behavioral Problems Index- External (2002)
-2.571 10.010
[Vol. 5:2
LEGAL STATUS & EFFECTS ON CHILDREN




B Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 3.451 0.092 37.578 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.034 0.014 -0.054 -2.363 0.018
2 (Constant) 3.170 0.108 29.221 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.024 0.014 -0.038 -1.642 0.101
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.679 0.189 0.084 3.596 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 0.753 1.103 0.015 0.682 0.495
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 0.982 0.281 0.080 3.493 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.999 0.433 0.053 2.307 0.021
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 1.910 4.946 0.009 0.386 0.699
3 (Constant) 3.128 0.117 26.846 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.021 0.015 -0.033 -1.435 0.151
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.429 0.326 0.053 1.315 0.189
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 0.729 1.104 0.015 0.660 0.509
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 0.970 0.321 0.079 3.027 0.003
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.813 0.509 0.043 1.597 0.110
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 1.941 4.957 0.009 0.392 0.695
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 0.687 0.630 0.026 1.089 0.276
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT -0.011 0.259 -0.001 -0.042 0.967
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.612 0.492 0.035 1.243 0.214
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.484 0.320 0.048 1.510 0.131
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED 0.001 0.362 0.000 0.004 0.997
(Constant) 4.393 0.453 9.695 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.019 0.014 -0.031 -1.322 0.186
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.409 0.326 0.051 1.254 0.210
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 0.802 1.102 0.016 0.728 0.467
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 0.957 0.320 0.078 2.990 0.003
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.840 0.508 0.044 1.652 0.099
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 2.030 4.948 0.009 0.410 0.682
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 0.601 0.630 0.023 0.955 0.340
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.005 0.259 0.001 0.020 0.984
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.619 0.491 0.035 1.261 0.207
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.470 0.320 0.047 1.471 0.141
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,




-0.327 10.113 -0.066 -2.888 10.004
4 .4. 4 4
5.162 0.729 7.079 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD -0.008 0.015 -0.013 -0.550 0.582
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.856 0.335 0.106 2.555 0.011
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 0.633 1.097 0.013 0.577 0.564
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 1.155 0.325 0.094 3.549 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 1.164 0.509 0.061 2.287 0.022
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS 2.152 4.902 0.010 0.439 0.661
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE 0.658 0.627 0.025 1.049 0.294
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT -0.014 0.258 -0.001 -0.053 0.958
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.374 0.489 0.021 0.766 0.444
MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.389 0.334 0.039 1.165 0.244
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.238 0.360 -0.024 -0.661 0.509
PARENTAL WARMTH SCALE
02 -0.348 0.116 -0.070 -3.004 0.003
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.082 0.146 -0.013 -0.566 0.571
CHILD AGE AT TIME OF PCG
IW - YEARS 02 -0.049 0.027 -0.047 -1.830 0.067
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 1.000
HEAD IS BLACK -0.700 0.233 -0.080 -3.008 0.003
HEAD IS HISPANIC-LATINO/A 0.927 0.234 0.098 3.969 0.000
HEAD IS ASIAN P1 1 -1.200 10.435 -0.063
R2 (adjusted) = .037; CDS Behavioral Problems Index (Internal), 2002
-2.761 0.006
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B Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 3.050 0.017 180.698 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.012 0.003 0.103 4.567 0.000
2 (Constant) 3.076 0.020 153.425 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.011 0.003 0.093 4.039 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? -0.089 0.035 -0.060 -2.565 0.010
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.048 0.204 -0.005 -0.237 0.812
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.025 0.052 -0.011 -0.484 0.629
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE -0.020 0.081 -0.006 -0.252 0.801
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -1.362 0.915 -0.034 -1.489 0.137
3 (Constant) 3.092 0.021 144.189 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.010 0.003 0.083 3.596 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.075 0.060 0.050 1.247 0.213
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.046 0.203 -0.005 -0.226 0.821
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.043 0.059 -0.019 -0.724 0.469
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.113 0.094 0.032 1.192 0.233
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -1.241 0.914 -0.031 -1.358 0.175
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.297 0.109 -0.066 -2.714 0.007
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.044 0.048 0.025 0.929 0.353
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED -0.209 0.091 -0.064 -2.308 0.021
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.211 0.059 -0.114 -3.562 0.000
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.134 0.067 -0.072 -2.010 0.045
I (Constant) 2.490 0.082 30.228 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.009 0.003 0.076 3.350 0.001
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.083 0.059 0.056 1.400 0.162
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.081 0.201 -0.009 -0.404 0.686
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.037 0.058 -0.016 -0.630 0.529
KID LIVES WITH BI MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.097 0.093 0.027 1.039 0.299
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -1.284 0.901 -0.032 -1.426 0.154
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.272 0.108 -0.061 -2.527 0.012
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.037 0.047 0.021 0.785 0.433
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED -0.211 0.089 -0.065 -2.361 0.018
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.203 0.058 -0.110 -3.483 0.001
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,













CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.006 0.003 0.052 2.252 0.024
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.054 0.061 0.036 0.877 0.380
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.052 0.200 -0.006 -0.260 0.795
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.007 0.059 -0.003 -0.119 0.905
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.082 0.094 0.023 0.882 0.378
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -1.282 0.896 -0.032 -1.431 0.153
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.238 0.108 -0.053 -2.208 0.027
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.012 0.047 0.006 0.247 0.805
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED -0.185 0.089 -0.057 -2.073 0.038
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.132 0.061 -0.071 -2.163 0.031
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.098 0.066 -0.053 -1.487 0.137
PARENTAL WARMTH
SCALE 02 0.146 0.021 0.158 6.894 0.000
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.066 0.027 -0.055 -2.466 0.014
CHILD AGE AT TIME OF
PCG IW - YEARS 02 -0.005 0.005 -0.023 -0.931 0.352
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE 0.006 0.002 0.067 2.592 0.010
HEAD IS BLACK -0.032 0.043 -0.020 -0.764 0.445
HEAD IS HISPANIC-
LATINO/A -0.162 0.043 -0.093 -3.806 0.000
HEAD IS ASIAN PI -0.025 10.079
R2 (adjusted) = .060; Pearlin Self-Efficacy Scale, CDS 2002
-0.007 -0.321 0.748
[Vol. 5:2
2008] LEGAL STATUS & EFFECTS ON CHILDREN




B Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 3.360 0.013 267.986 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.009 0.002 0.106 4.662 0.000
2 (Constant) 3.367 0.015 226.747 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.008 0.002 0.099 4.297 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? -0.051 0.026 -0.047 -1.999 0.046
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.116 0.151 -0.017 -0.769 0.442
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.005 0.039 -0.003 -0.125 0.900
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.208 0.060 0.079 3.479 0.001
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -0.496 0.678 -0.017 -0.732 0.464
3 (Constant) 3.373 0.016 212.917 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.007 0.002 0.087 3.787 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.011 0.044 0.010 0.257 0.797
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.115 0.150 -0.017 -0.767 0.443
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.044 0.044 -0.026 -1.005 0.315
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.232 0.070 0.088 3.320 0.001
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -0.493 0.675 -0.016 -0.730 0.465
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.041 0.081 -0.012 -0.511 0.609
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.069 0.035 0.051 1.946 0.052
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED -0.002 0.067 -0.001 -0.025 0.980
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.169 0.044 -0.123 -3.870 0.000
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED -0.006 0.049 -0.004 -0.121 0.903
I (Constant) 2.849 0.061 47.077 0.000
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DIV
CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.007 0.002 0.079 3.510 0.000
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.018 0.044 0.017 0.423 0.672
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.146 0.147 -0.022 -0.989 0.323
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.039 0.043 -0.023 -0.901 0.368
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.218 0.068 0.083 3.185 0.001
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -0.531 0.661 -0.018 -0.803 0.422
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.020 0.079 -0.006 -0.254 0.799
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.062 0.035 0.046 1.800 0.072
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED -0.003 0.066 -0.001 -0.049 0.961
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.162 0.043 -0.118 -3.794 0.000
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,













CENSUS NEEDS STANDARD 0.005 0.002 0.054 2.382 0.017
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? -0.074 0.044 -0.067 -1.668 0.096
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? -0.147 0.145 -0.022 -1.012 0.312
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD -0.059 0.043 -0.035 -1.360 0.174
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.149 0.068 0.057 2.199 0.028
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS -0.609 0.649 -0.020 -0.938 0.348
MOM MARRIED AND
WIDOWED AT LEAST ONCE -0.004 0.078 -0.001 -0.046 0.963
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED STILL INTACT 0.051 0.034 0.038 1.478 0.140
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
REMARRIED, NOW
DIVORCED 0.048 0.065 0.020 0.739 0.460
MOM NEVER MARRIED -0.118 0.044 -0.086 -2.674 0.008
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED 0.051 0.048 0.037 1.076 0.282
PARENTAL WARMTH
SCALE 02 0.124 0.015 0.181 8.124 0.000
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.029 0.019 -0.033 -1.526 0.127
CHILD AGE AT TIME OF
PCG 1W - YEARS 02 -0.003 0.004 -0.022 -0.914 0.361
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE 0.001 0.002 0.019 0.770 0.441
HEAD IS BLACK 0.092 0.031 0.077 2.996 0.003
HEAD IS HISPANIC-
LATINO/A -0.219 0.031 -0.169 -7.106 0.000
HEAD IS ASIAN PI 0.001 0.058 0.000
R2 (adjusted) =.104; Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, CDS 2002
0.009 0.993
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TABLE 10. EFFECT OF A ONE-UNIT CHANGE IN PREDICTOR ON
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (PROPORTION OF A STANDARD DEVIATION):
SUMMARY OF ALL MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES; FINAL STEP
FROM EACH ANALYSIS (SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ONLY)
OUTCOMES (DEPENDENT BPI BPI BPI SELF SELF




DIVIDED BY CENSUS NEEDS
STANDARD 0.0013738 0.001497
SEX OF CDS CHILD -0.21908 -0.115438327
CHILD'S AGE AT TIME OF
INTERVIEW -0.03797 -0.014294594 -0.015058213
AGE OF MOTHER OR
MOTHER FIGURE -0.005854695
HEAD IS BLACK -0.216597424 0.029742
HEAD IS HISPANIC-LATINO/A -0.090871125 0.286641915 -0.0668909 -0.07054
HEAD IS ASIAN PI -0.72765 -0.255136174 -0.371089142
HEAD IS OTHER RACE - AM
INDIAN, ETC
HEAD IS WHITE (REF)
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND NO BIO DAD? 0.474498 0.178395398 0.264718657 -0.0217882 -0.02387
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND ADOPTIVE DAD? 0.4729471
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND STEPDAD 0.726571 0.24945777 0.357231368
KID LIVES WITH BIO MOM
AND OTHER DAD FIGURE 0.53186 0.359946476 0.0438003 0.047995
KID LIVES WITH TWO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS
KID LIVES WITH BOTH
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS (REF)
MOM MARRIED AND






MOM NEVER MARRIED 0.390665 0.163012554 -0.0347441 -0.03805
MOM MARRIED, DIVORCED,
NEVER REMARRIED
MOM MARRIED ONCE -
MARRIAGE INTACT (REF)
PARENTAL WARMTH SCALE
02 -0.40525 -0.187898811 -0.10754948 0.0366067 0.040045
